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The Social Science Approach to International Law
Daniel Abebe, Adam Chilton† & Tom Ginsburg‡

Abstract
For over a hundred years, scholars have argued that international law should be studied
using a “scientific” approach. Throughout the twentieth century, however, the most prominent
methods used to study international law primarily consisted of different theoretical and analytical
claims about how international law should be developed, interpreted, and critiqued. It is only in
the first two decades of the twenty-first century that the conventional social science approach to
research—identifying a specific question, developing hypotheses, using a research design to test
those hypotheses based on some form of qualitative or quantitative data, and presenting
conclusions, all while acknowledging the assumptions upon which these conclusions are based and
the level of uncertainty associated with the results—became widely used by scholars of
international law. International law research using the social science approach has been notably
more normatively restrained, empirically informed, and skeptical than past international law
scholarship. This Essay describes the rise of the social science approach and advocates for its
continued adoption.
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I. I NTRODUCTION
At the start of the twentieth century, in 1908, the American Journal of
International Law (AJIL) published an article by Lassa Oppenheim titled “The
Science of International Law: Its Task and Method.”1 In the article, Oppenheim
argued that there was a distinctive science of international law, but that too many
students of the subject went to “work without a proper knowledge of the task of
our science, without knowing how to make use of the assertions of authorities,
and without the proper views for the valuation and appreciation of the material at
hand.”2 Oppenheim further argued that there are seven “tasks to which our
science must devote itself . . . : Exposition of the existing rules of law, historical
research, criticism of the existing law, preparation of codification, distinction
between the old customary and the new conventional law, fostering of arbitration,
and popularization of international law.”3 After discussing how each of these tasks
could be addressed scientifically, Oppenheim concluded by arguing that there was
only one appropriate method to apply to those tasks—what he dubbed the
“positive method”—which he claimed, “can successfully be applied only by those
workers who are imbued with the idealistic outlook on life and matters.”4
At the end of the twentieth century, in 1999, AJIL hosted a symposium on
the then-prevailing methods to study international law.5 The organizers,
Professors Steven Ratner and Anne-Marie Slaughter, began by noting that there
had been major developments in the science of international law in the nine
decades since the publication of Oppenheim’s article.6 Most notably, they argued
that the scope of international affairs regulated by international law had expanded
dramatically, and at the same time, the scope of methods used to study
international law correspondingly dramatically expanded.7 The Symposium then
highlighted seven methods that the organizers believed to “represent the major
methods of international legal scholarship” at the time: legal positivism, the New
Haven School, international legal process, critical legal studies, international law
and international relations, feminist jurisprudence, and law and economics.8
Prominent scholars associated with each of these methods wrote essays explaining

1

L. Oppenheim, The Science of International Law: Its Tasks and Method, 2 AM. J. INT’L L. 313 (1908).

2

Id. at 314.
Id.

3
4
5

6
7
8

Id. at 355.
Steven R. Ratner & Anne-Marie Slaughter, Appraising the Methods of International Law: A Prospectus for
Readers, 93 AM. J. INT’L L. 291 (1999).
Id. at 291.
Id.
Id. at 293.
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their approach and its value.9 The organizers specifically asked each scholar to
apply their method to analyze the same open question in international law: what
is the responsibility of individuals for human rights violations in non-international
armed conflicts?10 Although a few of the methods highlighted by the Symposium
quickly fell out of favor,11 other prominent methods were excluded,12 and at least
one of the world’s most prominent international law scholars pointedly refused to
participate.13 The Symposium can still be seen as a snapshot of common
approaches to international law roughly twenty years ago.
Although there were certainly major changes in the study of international
law in the ninety-one years between Oppenheim’s article and Ratner and
Slaughter’s Symposium, it is remarkable that they share two core assumptions
about the purpose of international law research. First, neither project considered
9
10

Id. at 298.
Id. at 295.

11

For example, as far as we can identify, the only published articles that have mentioned or referenced
the New Haven School since 2000 described the approach but did not actually use it themselves.
See Halil Rahman Basaran, Sovereign Immunity, Quo Vadis?, 27 N.Y. INT’L. L. REV. 1, 18–19 (2014);
Christian Lee González, Note, Law As A Means to Human Flourishing: Law, Morality, and Natural Law
in Policy-Oriented Perspective, 14 INTERCULTURAL HUM. RTS. L. REV. 289 (2019). One article claims
that there is a New-New Haven School: Janet Koven Levit, Bottom-Up International Lawmaking:
Reflections on the New Haven School of International Law, 32 YALE J. INT’L L. 393 (2007). For classic
papers using the New Haven approach, see Myres S. McDougal, Law and Power, 46 AM. J. INT’L L.
102 (1952); HAROLD D. LASSWELL & MYRES S. MCDOUGAL, JURISPRUDENCE FOR A FREE SOCIETY:
STUDIES IN LAW, SCIENCE, AND POLICY (1992). In contrast, “International Legal Process” was a
label that evolved out of the eponymous school in American legal thought and is still deployed
today. See, e.g., Mary Ellen O’Connell, New International Legal Process, 93 AM. J. INT’L L. 334 (1999).
For example, since 2010, 284 articles on Westlaw have used the term “International Legal Process,”
as
of
mid-May
2021.
See
WESTLAW,
https://www.westlaw.com/SharedLink/a985462a609647a581444c0a221f03bc?VR=3.0&RS=cblt
1.0. Classic studies include ABRAM CHAYES, THE CUBAN MISSILE CRISIS: INTERNATIONAL CRISIS
AND THE ROLE OF LAW (1974) and ABRAM CHAYES & ANTONIA HANDLER CHAYES, THE NEW
SOVEREIGNTY: COMPLIANCE WITH INTERNATIONAL REGULATORY AGREEMENTS (1995).

12

For example, the Symposium ignored approaches that were vital at the time, chiefly Marxism and
the just-emerging Third World Approaches to International Law (TWAIL). This was noted at the
time in a letter from Henry Richardson to the editors. Henry J. Richardson, III, Letter to the Editor,
94 AM. J. INT’L L. 99, 99 (2000) (expressing disappointment that perspectives of “people of color”
were not represented). See generally B.S. CHIMNI, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND WORLD ORDER: A
CRITIQUE OF CONTEMPORARY APPROACHES (1st ed. 1993) (articulating an integrated Marxist
approach to international law); James Thuo Gathii, TWAIL: A Brief History of its Origins, its
Decentralized Network, and a Tentative Bibliography, 3 TRADE L. & DEV. 26 (2011) (tracing TWAIL’s
contemporary origins in the late 1990s). See also James Thuo Gathii, The Promise of International Law:
A Third World View, Grotius Lecture Presented at the 2020 Virtual Annual Meeting of the American
Society of International Law (June 25, 2020), https://perma.cc/26YB-5KAZ (arguing that
international law scholars need to go outside the current beltway of the discipline).

13

The AJIL’s designated representative of critical legal studies, the eminent Finnish scholar Martti
Koskenniemi, completely refused to answer the question posed, and characterized the whole horserace exercise as reflecting “the logic of consumer capitalism.” Martti Koskenniemi, Letter to the
Editors of the Symposium, 93 AM. J. INT’L L. 351, 352 (1999).
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the possibility that the “science” of international law should be a conventional
social science. Instead, both projects mainly conceived of “methods” as a set of
assumptions and theoretical claims that should be leveraged by scholars trying to
understand international legal obligations.14 Second, both projects viewed
international legal scholarship as an enterprise focused on studying the substantive
obligations of international law. That is, both projects understood the tasks of
international legal scholarship to be writing about how international law should
be developed, interpreted, and critiqued. Using the distinction made famous by
H.L.A. Hart, both projects primarily adopted an “internal” view of international
law—that is, an approach that, whether descriptive or normative, is at its core a
doctrinal exercise—as opposed to an “external” view of international law—that
is, an approach that examines the law from outside, seeking to explain how it came
to be or what its consequences might be in the real world.15
In the first two decades of the twenty-first century, both of these
assumptions have been cast aside as a new generation of international legal
scholars have applied conventional social science methods to study external
questions about international law. By conventional methods of social science, we
refer to a research approach that involves clearly stating a research question,
developing hypotheses, using a research design to test those hypotheses based on
some form of qualitative or quantitative data, and presenting conclusions, all while
acknowledging the assumptions upon which they are based and the level of
uncertainty associated with those results. By external approach, we mean that
instead of arguing about topics like the best way to interpret treaties, these scholars
have studied topics like why countries sign treaties or the effect that signing
treaties has on behavior. These scholars have spent less time arguing about topics
like the merits of realism or constructivism, and more time arguing about topics
like the best way to empirically assess whether human rights treaties improve
human rights outcomes.
In this Essay, we document the rise of the social science approach to
international law, explain the basics of the method, and advocate for its continued
adoption. Our goal is to explain and advocate for an existing approach to
researching international law that focuses on testing hypotheses about how
international law works in practice. We endorse the study of external questions
about international law. But by describing the social science approach to
international law, we do not intend to restart a new debate about terms, labels, or
14

15

See Gregory Shaffer & Tom Ginsburg, The Empirical Turn in International Legal Scholarship, 106 AM. J.
INT’L L. 1, 3 (2012) (“The tendency, until recently, for international legal scholarship to be aloof to
empirical methods is reflected in the concept of ‘method’ used in the AJIL’s 1999 Symposium on
Method in International Law. Not one contribution in the symposium addressed method in a social
science sense, suggesting a significant gap between legal and social science scholarship. Rather, the
alternative ‘methods’ all involved theoretical and analytical claims.”).
See generally H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW (1st ed. 1961).

Summer 2021

5

Chicago Journal of International Law

schools. We are quite happy, in fact, that researchers in this field no longer have
to expend any time figuring out if they would like to be known as a realist,
constructivist, or some other “-ist.” Instead, our intent with writing this Essay is
to hopefully complete the move away from these kind of labels by pointing out
that it is possible to be an international law scholar without committing oneself to
any assumptions, theories, or philosophies beyond those required of any other
social science researcher.
Before continuing, it is important to clarify the scope of our argument. First,
we are not the first to document the emergence of this line of international law
scholarship. Simply put, this line of research is not a well-kept secret; it has been
published by leading scholars in prominent journals for at least twenty years. 16
Moreover, the basic outlines of the social science approach to international law
were discussed at least as early as 2005 when Jack Goldsmith and Eric Posner
called for a “New International Law Scholarship,”17 and the research produced by
this movement has been the subject of several review essays.18 Over the last few
years, the trend towards social science research of international law has continued,
but in addition to the quantity of scholarship increasing, so has the quality. There
have been major projects to collect and code new datasets of the contents of
international law,19 as well as to incorporate research methods that make the causal

16

To provide a sense of the relative weights of these different fields over time, we looked at
Certificates of Merit given by the American Society of International Law for books published since
1990. Each year, the Society gives three awards: (1) for a “preeminent contribution to creative
scholarship”; (2) in “a specialized area of international law”; and (3) for “high technical
craftsmanship and utility to practicing lawyers and scholars.” Honors and Awards, AM. SOC’Y INT’L
L., https://perma.cc/73SQ-5EZA. For example, in 2020, in addition to the volume on feminist
judgements, other Certificates of Merit were given to a technical volume that provides an internal
view of the Convention on the Rights of the Child and a volume on the treatment of international
organizations using the analogy to states. Our categorization of the books earning the awards since
1990 suggests that 15 of 96 have been awarded to projects that are social science in nature. Past
Recipients, AM. SOC’Y INT’L L., https://perma.cc/LL8X-ZZ6C (categorization of recipients’ work
on file with authors).

17

Jack Goldsmith & Eric A. Posner, Response, The New International Law Scholarship, 34 GA. J. INT’L
& COMP. L. 463 (2006).

18

For reviews of empirical literature on the effectiveness of international law, see Beth Simmons,
Treaty Compliance and Violation, 13 ANN. REV. POL. SCI. 273 (2010); Shaffer & Ginsburg, supra note
14; Emilie M. Hafner-Burton, A Social Science of Human Rights, 51 J. PEACE RES. 273 (2014); Kevin
L. Cope & Cosette D. Creamer, Response, Disaggregating the Human Rights Treaty Regime, 56 VA. J.
INT’L L. 459 (2016); Adam S. Chilton, Experimentally Testing the Effectiveness of Human Rights Treaties,
18 CHI. J. INT’L L. 164 (2017); Kevin L. Cope, Cosette D. Creamer & Mila Versteeg, Empirical Studies
of Human Rights Law, 15 ANN. REV. L. & SOC. SCI. 155 (2019); Adam Chilton & Katerina Linos,
Preferences and Compliance with International Law, THEORETICAL INQUIRES L. (forthcoming 2021).

19

See, e.g., BARBARA KOREMENOS, THE CONTINENT
AGREEMENT DESIGN (2016).
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estimates produced by this research more credible.20 Our goal is, thus, not to
identify new trends that have not previously been documented; instead, it is to
more fully describe and justify this social science approach than prior efforts.
Second, we do not believe the social science approach is the only useful way
to study international law. Instead, there are many other valid approaches to
studying international law, many of which we have previously used ourselves.
Social science approaches to international law should instead be understood as
one way to do research that scholars should embrace when appropriate to the
research question at hand.
Third, the social science approach to researching international law is not a
single method. Instead, scholars have used many methods taking a social science
approach to international legal scholarship, including the use of large-N
observational data,21 text analysis,22 survey experiments,23 field experiments,24 and
qualitative field research.25 However, although the research designs and data used
by these methods differ, the basic approach to research used by all these
methods—defining research questions, developing hypotheses, using data to test
those hypotheses, etc.—is the same.
Fourth, we are not unbiased observers of the trends we are describing. We
all have a background in international law and political science, and we are thus
advocating for the continued use of the methods that we have used throughout
our academic careers.
This Essay proceeds in three parts. Section II provides a thumbnail sketch
of the developments in international legal scholarship during the twentieth century
that set the stage for the social science approach to become more prominent in
the twenty-first century. Section III then describes the basics of the social science
20

See, e.g., Weijia Rao, Domestic Politics and Settlement in Investor-State Arbitration, J. LEGAL STUD.
(forthcoming).

21

See, e.g., Rachel Brewster & Adam Chilton, Supplying Compliance: Why and When the United States
Complies with WTO Rulings, 39 YALE J. INT’L L. 201 (2014); Pierre-Hughes Verdier & Erik Voeten,
Precedent, Compliance and Change in Customary International Law: An Explanatory Theory, 108 AM. J. INT’L
L. 389 (2014); Pierre-Hughes Verdier & Mila Versteeg, International Law in National Legal Systems: An
Empirical Investigation, 109 AM. J. INT’L L. 514 (2015); Julian Nyarko, Giving the Treaty a Purpose:
Comparing the Durability of Treaties and Executive Agreements, 113 AM. J. INT’L L. 54 (2019).

22

See, e.g., Julian Nyarko & Jerome Hsiang, Conforming Against Expectations: The Formalism of Non-Lawyers
at the WTO, 48 J. LEGAL STUD. 341 (2019); Cree Jones & Weijia Rao, Sticky BITs, 61 HARV. J. INT’L
L. 357 (2020).
See, e.g., Adam S. Chilton, The Influence of International Human Rights Agreements on Public Opinion: An
Experimental Study, 15 CHI. J. INT’L L. 110 (2014); Anton Strezhnev, Beth A. Simmons & Matthew
D. Kim, Rulers or Rules? International Law, Elite Cues and Public Opinion, 30 EUR. J. INT’L L. 1281 (2019).

23

24

See, e.g., Michael G. Findley, Daniel L. Nielsen & J.C. Sharman, Using Field Experiments in International
Relations: A Randomized Experiment of Anonymous Incorporation, 67 INT’L ORG. 657 (2013).

25

See, e.g., GALIT A. SARFATY, VALUES IN TRANSLATION: HUMAN RIGHTS AND THE CULTURE OF THE
WORLD BANK (2012).
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approach to research and explains several ways this approach differs from prior
efforts to study international law. Section IV concludes.

II. A T HUMBNAI L H ISTORY OF R ECENT I NTERNATIONAL
L EGAL S CHOLARSHIP
Many articles have documented the evolution of international law
scholarship, and a full accounting is beyond the scope of this Essay. But, broadly
speaking, since Oppenheim’s call for greater scientific rigor in the study of
international law in 1908, there have been two main sources of influence on the
evolution of scholarship in this area: (1) the real-world problems that international
law was asked to address and (2) broader research trends in the academy. These
real-world problems generated new questions and debates that social science
research methods were suitable to answer, and the broader research trends in the
academy integrated international legal scholarship more directly with the empirical
revolutions taking place across relevant fields, including international relations and
public law. We discuss each of these trends in turn.

A. Real-World Problems
In the United States, international legal scholarship has been closely linked
with legal practice, at least since Secretary of State Elihu Root founded the
American Society of International Law in 1906.26 Perhaps even more so than other
disciplines within the legal academy, scholarship and advocacy were mutually
reinforcing in international law scholarship. Advocates would write academic
articles supporting litigation positions, and in many cases in the explicit interest of
their national governments. As a result, international legal scholarship has been
closely influenced by key events in international affairs.
Since 1908, the international community has experienced three major
transformational moments, after which it has turned to law to solve problems.
Those moments followed major global conflict: World War I, World War II, and
the Cold War. After each of these conflicts, new international agreements were
drafted, and new international institutions were established. Each set of new
agreements and institutions was greeted with hope, but soon politics intervened
again, and expectations were diminished.
First, after World War I, the League of Nations was established along with
the Permanent Court of International Justice. These institutions consolidated an
earlier round of developments that began with the Hague Peace Conference of
1899 and reflected a new optimism that international organizations could help
secure peace. War was outlawed by the Kellogg-Briand Treaty in 1928, reflecting

26

ASIL History, AM. SOC’Y INT’L L., https://perma.cc/Y5TK-2RJZ.
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great faith in the power of law to help states beat swords into plowshares.27 We
know, of course, how this era of liberalism ended. It was pilloried by E.H. Carr in
his classic The Twenty Years’ Crisis, which was published just as the world descended
again into war.28
Second, in the aftermath of World War II, new problems of international
organization came to the fore. Notably, the United Nations was established, and
almost immediately, it became the repository of many hopes for a more peaceful
future. The Bretton Woods institutions—the World Bank and the International
Monetary Fund—were established to stabilize the international monetary system,
the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade was promulgated to regulate
international trade, human rights discourse flowered, and the Geneva
Conventions were revived and expanded to codify the laws of war. Many
international legal scholars actively participated in the drafting of these agreements
and the establishment of these organizations. In fact, the law of international
organizations emerged as a distinct field.29 Additionally, the emergence of new
nations in the process of decolonization led to important debates on sovereignty
and the role of capital. It is worth noting that, despite the initial hope during this
period, by the mid-1960s, international lawyers often expressed frustration at the
inability of law to constrain power.30
Third, the aftermath of the Cold War marked a new era for international
relations, and for international legal scholarship as well. American hegemony and
the end of the Cold War breathed new life into international institutions, just as it
had at the end of World War II and, to a lesser extent, World War I. The U.N.
Security Council’s formal authorization of the first Iraq war, the most significant
military conflict that had occurred since the Korean War, suggested that the U.N.
Charter’s collective security regime might have some new life.31 Enthusiasts of
globalization produced a whole series of new agreements to facilitate trade,
including the institutionalization of the World Trade Organization.32 The
European Union’s integration project, which had been revitalized by the 1987
27

28

29

30
31
32

OONA A. HATHAWAY & SCOTT J. SHAPIRO, THE INTERNATIONALISTS: HOW A RADICAL PLAN TO
OUTLAW WAR REMADE THE WORLD (2017).
See generally EDWARD HALLETT CARR, THE TWENTY YEARS’ CRISIS: 1919–1939: AN INTRODUCTION
TO THE STUDY OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS (1st ed. 1939).
See generally Oscar Schachter, United Nations Law, 88 AM. J. INT’L L. 1 (1994); G. G. Fitzmaurice
(Special Rapporteur), Law of Treaties, [1956] 2 Y.B. INT’L L. COMM’N 104, 108, U.N. Doc
A/CN.4/101 (describing four constituent elements of international organizations). To be sure,
international organizations had existed well before World War II, but their number and scope
expanded dramatically thereafter. Madeline Herren, International Organizations 1865–1945, in
OXFORD HANDBOOK INT’L ORG. (Jacob Katz Cogan, Ian Hurd & Ian Johnstone, eds., 2016).
See generally WOLFGANG FRIEDMANN, LAW IN A CHANGING SOCIETY (1964).
S.C. Res. 678 (Nov. 29, 1990).
Richard Steinberg, The Uruguay Round: A Legal Analysis of the Final Act, 6 INT’L Q. 1 (1994).
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Single European Act, deepened with the 1992 Maastricht Agreement.33 A network
of bilateral investment treaties began to expand toward the end of the decade.
Together, this meant the rapid legalization of international economic life.34
During the 1990s, a desire to respond to mass atrocities also led to the
development of new international institutions. The ad hoc criminal tribunals for
Rwanda and former Yugoslavia presaged developments of “hybrid” efforts in
Cambodia, Sierra Leone, and Lebanon. And the 1998 Rome Statute set up a
permanent International Criminal Court with jurisdiction over citizens of states
that had not consented to the agreement.35 Meanwhile, new efforts at nationbuilding and trusteeship involved the U.N. deeply in problems of administration,
in which it managed states coming out of conflict.36
The new international agreements and institutions created by these three
transformational moments all produced new directions in international legal
scholarship.37 For example, the expansion of international economic law through
new trade and investment rules created thriving and technical fields of legal
research.38 Similarly, the expansion of international tribunals created academic
research programs like the Project on International Courts and Tribunals, which
cataloged some twenty-five international tribunals.39 Many of these involved what
Karen Alter called the “New Terrain” of International Law, in parts of the world
far from Europe and North America.40 These tribunals were of course agents of
further legalization and judicialization.41 In turn, theorists anticipated that

33

Finn Laursen & Sophie Vanhoonacker, The Maastricht Treaty: Creating the European Union, in OXFORD
RSCH. ENCYCLOPEDIA POL. (2019).

34

Zachary Elkins, Andrew T. Guzman & Beth A. Simmons, Competing for Capital: The Diffusion of
Bilateral Investment Treaties, 1960–2000, 60 INT’L ORG. 811 (2006).

35

Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, arts. 1, 12, July 17, 1998, 2187 U.N.T.S. 90.
See generally SIMON CHESTERMAN, YOU, THE PEOPLE: THE UNITED NATIONS, TRANSITIONAL
ADMINISTRATION, AND STATE BUILDING (2004).
As just one small example, the journal International Organization produced scholarship focused on
the legalization of world politics to explore how law influenced the activities of international
institutions and organizations. Judith Goldstein et al., Introduction: Legalization and World Politics, 54
INT’L ORG. 385 (2000); Kenneth W. Abbott et al., The Concept of Legalization, 54 INT’L ORG 401
(2000).

36

37

38

39

40
41

See, e.g., Rachel Brewster, Rule-Based Dispute Resolution in International Trade Law, 92 VA. L. REV. 251
(2006); Anu Bradford, When the WTO Works, and How It Fails, 51 VA. J. INT’L L. 1 (2010); Mark Wu,
The “China, Inc.” Challenge to Global Trade Governance, 57 HARV. INT’L L.J. 261 (2016).
The Project on International Courts and Tribunals, in THE MANUAL ON INTERNATIONAL COURTS AND
TRIBUNALS (Ruth Mackenzie et al. eds., 2d ed. 2010).
See generally KAREN J. ALTER, THE NEW TERRAIN OF INTERNATIONAL LAW (2014).
See generally MARTIN SHAPIRO & ALEC STONE SWEET, ON LAW, POLITICS, AND JUDICIALIZATION
(2002).
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judicialization might mean the expansion of governance, with a virtuous cycle of
governance by law.42

B. Trends in the Academy
Beyond the impact of these major world events, international legal
scholarship was also influenced by developments in adjacent academic subjects
and disciplines. As international law became more important, political scientists
and international relations theorists became interested in it.43 During the Cold War
period, scholars of the realist school were able to describe international law as
“epiphenomenal,” since it did not seem to have much bearing on the major
international relations questions of the day.44 The claim became harder to defend
when states were voluntarily legalizing their international relationships at a rapid
pace. To understand these developments, scholars turned to newly revived
institutionalist approaches in the social sciences and integrated these into law. 45
The institutionalist turn in the social sciences happened just as the fall of the Soviet
Union shifted attention away from ideology as the core target of political and
sociological analysis, and after the cycle of behaviorism that had dominated some
fields in the preceding decades had run its course.46
Institutionalism stood for the idea that individual agents were embedded in
broader institutional structures and that these structures “mattered,” meaning they
shaped outcomes. While various disciplines adopted slightly different approaches
to the study of institutions, a concise and influential formulation among
economists and political scientists was that institutions demand attention because
42

43

See generally Alec Stone Sweet, Judicialization and the Construction of Governance, 32 COMP. POL. STUD.
147 (1999).
Social science approaches to international law initially focused on connecting with international
relations theory. This literature featured a set of stylized schools—realist, institutionalist,
constructivist—that put forth grand propositions about the possibilities of cooperation. See, e.g.,
John K. Setear, An Iterative Perspective on Treaties: A Synthesis of International Relations Theory and
International Law, 37 HARV. INT’L L.J. 139 (1996).

44

See generally John J. Mearsheimer, The False Promise of International Institutions, 19 INT’L SEC. 5 (1994–
1995) (describing law as epiphenomenal).

45

See generally JAMES G. MARCH & JOHAN P. OLSEN, REDISCOVERING INSTITUTIONS: THE
ORGANIZATIONAL BASIS OF POLITICS (1989); THE NEW INSTITUTIONALISM IN ORGANIZATIONAL
ANALYSIS (Walter W. Powell & Paul J. DiMaggio eds., 1991); SUPREME COURT DECISION-MAKING:
NEW INSTITUTIONALIST APPROACHES (Cornell W. Clayton & Howard Gillman eds., 1999). A
fundamental contribution for international law is ROBERT O. KEOHANE, AFTER HEGEMONY:
COOPERATION AND DISCORD IN THE WORLD POLITICAL ECONOMY (2d ed. 2005).

46

Behaviorism had emphasized the study of observable and quantifiable behavior as opposed to
formal rules and institutions and tended to focus on the individual decision-maker. One can see
traces of this in the New Haven School approach with “decision” as the central explanandum. The
focus was on providing a formula for the authoritative international decision-maker to optimize,
weighing the various policy-oriented considerations. See generally LASSWELL & MCDOUGAL, supra
note 11.
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they are the rules of the game that structure behavior.47 Whether deployed by
political scientists, sociologists, or economists, institutionalism emphasized
collective structures, and this represented a paradigm shift away from behaviorism
as the object of scientific inquiry. Institutionalism fit easily with law, as a social
device that explicitly provides rule of the game, and so spurred much work on
international law.
A major development in this field during the 1990s was the development of
a liberal school of international relations and international law. Starting with a
positive observation about state behavior, namely that liberal states tended to
observe their promises to each other, scholars like Anne-Marie Slaughter drew on
the economic insight that law served as a commitment device.48 By providing a
way of imposing costs over time, law made promises more credible, and thus more
valuable. States that tied their hands through law could cooperate more easily
across borders.
This scholarship combined positive and normative analysis and sought to
move international law in a direction that was more protective of individual
interests and human rights.49 The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)
bombing of the former Yugoslavia to protect Kosovar Albanians in 1999 was a
major development in that it purported to reach into the borders of a sovereign
state to protect a persecuted population. Some international lawyers argued that it
marked an evolution in the regime governing the use of force.50 In the words of
the Independent International Commission on Kosovo, the invasion by NATO
had been “illegal but legitimate.”51 The next year the Canadian government
47

48

See generally DOUGLASS C. NORTH, INSTITUTIONS, INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE AND ECONOMIC
PERFORMANCE (1990) (describing an alternative approach to institutionalism in sociology that
attacked rational choice theory and sought to focus on social, cultural, and organizational forces
that shaped behavior). See THE NEW INSTITUTIONALISM IN ORGANIZATIONAL ANALYSIS, supra note
45 (describing another approach, historical institutionalism, that traced path dependencies and
critical junctures over time).
See generally JON ELSTER, ULYSSES UNBOUND: STUDIES IN RATIONALITY, PRECOMMITMENT, AND
CONSTRAINTS (2000); Stephen Holmes, Precommitment and the Paradox of Democracy, in PASSIONS &
CONSTRAINT: ON THE THEORY OF LIBERAL DEMOCRACY 134 (1995).

49

For example, Slaughter supported projects like the International Criminal Court and the doctrine
of a Responsibility to Protect, which would justify international intervention as a last resort in
situations of mass atrocity. She was a central figure in the formation of the Princeton Principles on
Universal Jurisdiction, which promised to hold perpetrators of mass atrocity accountable before
national courts. PRINCETON PROJECT ON UNIVERSAL JURISDICTION, THE PRINCETON PRINCIPLES
ON UNIVERSAL JURISDICTION (2001), https://perma.cc/S559-TCTM.

50

See generally MICHAEL J. GLENNON, LIMITS OF LAW, PREROGATIVES OF POWER: INTERVENTIONISM
AFTER KOSOVO (2001); Ralph Zacklin, Beyond Kosovo: The United Nations and Humanitarian Intervention,
41 VA. J. INT’L. L. 923 (2001); Emily Schroeder, Note, The Kosovo Crisis: Humanitarian Imperative Versus
International Law, 28 FLETCHER F. WORLD AFF. 179 (2004); Julie Mertus, Reconsidering the Legality of
Humanitarian Intervention: Lessons from Kosovo, 41 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1743 (2000).
THE INDEPENDENT INTERNATIONAL COMMISSION ON KOSOVO, THE KOSOVO REPORT 4 (2000).
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established the International Commission on Intervention and States Sovereignty,
which coined the phrase the “responsibility to protect.”52
However, the liberal school’s project began to flounder with the
circumstances of the second Iraq war. The idea that liberal states complied with
international law was hard to maintain with the American invasion, unsupported
as it was by a U.N. Security Council Resolution or any viable claim of self-defense
under international law. Instead, it looked like an example of what Detlev Vagts
called “hegemonic international law,” in which the sole superpower ignored basic
rules of the international legal order.53
During this time, several approaches to international legal scholarship that
rejected many of the assumptions of past research emerged. Notably, Jack
Goldsmith and Eric Posner published The Limits of International Law, which argued
that international law should be better understood as endogenous to state
preferences instead of as an exogenous constraint on state behavior.54 In a world
of independent nation-states, cooperation was possible, but only in response to
particular conditions. Using game theory, Goldsmith and Posner laid out these
conditions, while arguing against utopian and idealistic views.55
A separate set of critiques of prior approaches came from a different
academic direction, namely the emergence and expansion of critical legal studies
and connected scholarly movements. Critical legal studies was a scholarly
movement in American legal academia that became prominent in the late 1970s,
utilizing techniques of deconstruction to show the indeterminacy of law. In the
case of international law, this was not a particularly hard project. But critical
scholars took as their aim some of the liberal pieties about rights and remedies.
David Kennedy’s The Dark Sides of Virtue was one particularly pointed example.56
The emphasis was on exposing the internal contradictions of others rather than
building up an affirmative program.
Additionally, feminist legal theory began to play an important role in the
early 1990s for international lawyers. Hilary Charlesworth, Christine Chinkin, and
Shelly Wright applied the general approaches of feminist legal theory to

52

53
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INT’L COMM’N ON INTERVENTION AND STATE SOVEREIGNTY, THE RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT
(2001).
Detlev F. Vagts, Hegemonic International Law, 95 AM. J. INT’L L. 843 (2001).
JACK L. GOLDSMITH & ERIC A. POSNER, THE LIMITS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW (2005).
The reaction to Goldsmith and Posner’s book from traditional international lawyers was notably
critical. See, e.g., Balakrishnan Rajagopal, Book Review, 19 ETHICS & INT’L AFF. 106 (2005); Paul Schiff
Berman, Seeing Beyond the Limits of International Law, 84 TEX. L. REV. 1265 (2006) (reviewing
GOLDSMITH & POSNER, supra note 54). See generally MARY ELLEN O’CONNELL, THE POWER AND
PURPOSE OF INTERNATIONAL LAW (2008).
DAVID KENNEDY, THE
HUMANITARIANISM (2004).
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international law, by looking at the actual impact of doctrines on women.57 They
tied the feminine voice to the voice of the non-Western world, with both being
examples of what would be called the “subaltern” in other parts of the academy.
A number of scholars have followed in articulating a feminist approach to
international law.58 For example, last year’s ASIL Certificate of Merit for Creative
Scholarship went to Feminist Judgments in International Law.59 This work is part of a
broader line of legal scholarship, rewriting judicial opinions in many areas of law
from a feminist perspective.60 The feminist work originated with a theoretical
insight and is clearly a normative project that has had some success, informing
several developments in international criminal law.61
Another line of critical work emerged with Third World Approaches to
International Law (TWAIL), a field that began to consolidate with the publication
of Antony Anghie’s Imperialism, Sovereignty and the Making of International Law in
2004.62 This was a historical look at the deep links between modern international
law and European colonialism. TWAIL scholars focused on international law’s
close entwinement with imperialism, arguing that the connection was not just
limited to the classical era but is continually being re-enacted today. This is an
external view that emphasizes power and history and is increasingly popular: a
TWAIL Law Review has just been launched.63 In this vein, we have also seen a
recent push for a Critical Race Theory approach to international law.64
There has also been a “historical turn” among other critical scholars.
Koskenniemi’s ambitious project is central to this enterprise.65 Taking
international legal argument as his object, Koskenniemi’s two major volumes have
laid out a critical history of international law as a “Gentle Civilizer of Nations.” 66
57

Hilary Charlesworth et al., Feminist Approaches to International Law, 85 AM. J. INT’L L. 613 (1991).
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See generally Karen Knop & Annelise Riles, Space, Time, and Historical Injustice: A Feminist Conflict-ofLaws Approach to the “Comfort Women” Settlement, 102 CORNELL L. REV. 853 (2017); Anne Orford,
Feminism, Imperialism, and the Mission of International Law, 71 NORDIC J. INT’L L. 275 (2002).
FEMINIST JUDGEMENTS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW (Loveday Hodson & Troy Lavers eds., 2019); see
Honors and Awards, AM. SOC’Y INT’L L., supra note 16.
FEMINIST JUDGEMENTS: FROM THEORY TO PRACTICE (Rosemary Hunter, Clare McGlynn & Erika
Rackley eds., 2010).
See, e.g., Navanethem Pillay, Sexual Violence: Standing by the Victim, 42 CASE W. RSRV. J. INT’L L. 459
(2009).
ANTONY ANGHIE, IMPERIALISM, SOVEREIGNTY AND THE MAKING OF INTERNATIONAL LAW (2005).
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TWAILR: THIRD WORLD APPROACHES INT’L L. REV., https://perma.cc/E979-HGG5.
See generally Anna Spain Bradley, Human Rights Racism, 32 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 1 (2019); Makau Matua,
Critical Race Theory and International Law: The View of an Insider-Outsider, 45 VILL. L. REV. 841 (2000).
Anne Orford, International Law and the Limits of History, in THE LAW OF INTERNATIONAL LAWYERS:
READING MARTTI KOSKENNIEMI 297, 297 (Wouter Werner, Marieke de Hoon & Alexis Galan eds.,
2017).
MARTTI KOSKENNIEMI, THE GENTLE CIVILIZER OF NATIONS: THE RISE AND FALL OF
INTERNATIONAL LAW 1870–1960 (2001).
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Anne Orford has similarly sought to approach history from the perspective of a
sociologist of knowledge, drawing on Foucault.67
Finally, several scholars, including many of those using historical
approaches, began to look away from the traditional European roots of
international law. Emblematic here is the Oxford Handbook of the History of
International Law, which importantly sought to decenter Europe in the history of
the discipline.68 Scholars from Asia such as Yasuaki Onuma sought to lay out
alternative framings,69 while other scholars sought to recover how international
law was encountered by societies outside the European core. Arnulf Becker
Lorca’s book Mestizo International Law was an important contribution in this
regard.70 This non-Western turn was also embodied in the work of Emilia Justyna
Powell on Islamic Law,71 a major edited volume on the Bandung Conference,72
and Anthea Roberts’ book, Is International Law International?, which uses an
empirical approach to answer the question decidedly in the negative.73 And
China’s rise has given impetus to work articulating a Chinese view of the field,
including an English-language Chinese Journal of International Law.74
As this brief discussion illustrates, broad academic trends—for instance,
toward institutional analysis in the social sciences and critical theory in law, and
away from Europe in history—have all affected the progression of international
legal scholarship.

III. I NTERNATIONAL L AW AS S OCIAL S CIEN CE
Both the real-world developments in international relations and the
incorporation of theories from other legal subjects and academic disciplines
moved international legal scholarship toward social science. As Shaffer and
Ginsburg documented almost a decade ago, international law subsequently took
an empirical turn, and broad debates about the efficacy of law have been replaced
by the study of conditional effects, examining where and when law is effective. 75
67

ANNE ORFORD, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE POLITICS OF HISTORY (forthcoming June 2021).
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OXFORD HANDBOOK OF THE HISTORY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW (Bardo Fassbender & Anne Peters
eds., 2012).
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ONUMA YASUAKI, INTERNATIONAL LAW IN A TRANSCIVILIZATIONAL WORLD (2017).
ARNULF BECKER LORCA, MESTIZO INTERNATIONAL LAW (2014).
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EMILIA JUSTYNA POWELL, ISLAMIC LAW
DISPUTES (2020).
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BANDUNG, GLOBAL HISTORY AND INTERNATIONAL LAW: CRITICAL PASTS AND PENDING FUTURES
(Luis Eslava et al. eds., 2017).
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ANTHEA ROBERTS, IS INTERNATIONAL LAW INTERNATIONAL? (2017).
CHINESE J. INT’L L., https://perma.cc/U3BX-J876. See also CONGYAN CAI, THE RISE OF CHINA
AND INTERNATIONAL LAW: TAKING CHINESE EXCEPTIONALISM SERIOUSLY (2019).
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In this essay, we go one step further and argue that it is not just the case that
international legal research has become increasingly empirical. Instead, a growing
body of research treats international law as a subject to be studied using the
conventional approach to social sciences.
A. The Basics
The basic social science approach to research is based on the scientific
method. Simply put, a researcher hoping to gain new knowledge about the world
begins by identifying a specific research question. For instance, one research
question that has consumed a great deal of attention in international legal circles
is whether signing Bilateral Investment Treaties (BITs) leads to increased
investment flows between the countries that sign them.76
After identifying the research question, the next step is to develop a specific
hypothesis that can be empirically assessed. A hypothesis in a social science
framework stipulates a possible empirical relationship between two or more
variables. For our BITs example, one hypothesis a researcher may be interested in
testing is whether signing BITs increases investment flows between the countries
that sign them. Alternatively, the hypothesis may put forth a conditional theory in
some way. For example, a hypothesis may be that BITs only increase investments
when they are signed by large countries with pre-existing investment flows.
Relatedly, as part of specifying the hypothesis, the research specifies a null
hypothesis (typically that there is no relationship between the variables of interest)
and identifies the conditions under which the null hypothesis is rejected. Or, put
another way, the researcher identifies the conditions under which the research can
claim support for the hypothesis.
Next, the researcher identifies a research design and data that will make it
possible to assess the validity of their hypothesis. This research design should
ideally make it possible, under a set of clearly articulated assumptions, to provide
direct evidence to prove or disprove the hypothesis. For instance, a basic research
design that could be used to test the effect of BITs on investments may involve
collecting data on bilateral investment flows between all countries over a given
period, and then comparing the change in investment between pairs of countries
that signed a BIT in a given year to other pairs of countries that did not. That said,
a problem with this research design is that evidence that BITs are associated with
higher investment flows may not be enough to claim that the BITs cause those
higher flows. This is because other factors may have caused both the signing of
the BIT and the changes of investment. Ideally then, a research design would make
76

See, e.g., Jason Webb Yackee, Do BITs ‘Work’? Empirical Evidence from France, 7 J. INT’L DISPUTE
SETTLEMENT 55 (2016); Lauge N. Skovgaard Poulsen, The Importance of BITs for Foreign Direct
Investment and Political Risk Insurance: Revisiting the Evidence, in 2009–2010 Y.B. INT’L INV. L. POL’Y 539
(Karl P. Sauvant ed., 2010).

16

Vol. 22 No. 1

The Social Science Approach

Abebe, Chilton & Ginsburg

it possible to rule out the possibility that changes in the outcome of interests were
attributable to the phenomena being studied. For instance, a researcher could
leverage a natural experiment that changed the legal protection of some BITs but
not others in a quasi-random way to see if those changes are associated with
increased investment.77
It is important to note that there are a wide range of different social science
research designs, and correspondingly, a wide range of data that can be used to
empirically assess the validity of different hypotheses. For instance, our running
example of testing the effects of BITs by looking at data on investment flows
could be described as a reduced-form analysis using observational data. But it
would be possible to test the effects of BITs in other ways using quantitative data,
and it would also be possible to assess the effects of BITs using qualitative data.
As one example, a researcher could explore whether corporate executives report
that signing BITs influences their decisions on where to invest.78
Finally, in addition to stating the results when using the research design, a
hallmark of social science research is clearly identifying the assumptions that are
required for the conclusions of the analysis to be valid and also explaining the
uncertainty of that estimate. In our example, instead of simply saying “BITs do
not change investment flows,” a careful social science researcher would want to
explain the assumptions implicit in their research design and say how confident
they can be in their conclusion based on their evidence.

B. Some Issues Specific to International Law
There is nothing particularly complicated about importing this basic social
science approach to research into the study of international law. That said, the
approach does have some differences with many prior approaches to the study of
international law that are worth noting.
First, the social science approach typically adopts an “external” view of
international law.79 Any legal field, including international law, has an internal
viewpoint, and scholarship plays a role in producing it. In international law,
however, the internal viewpoint has continued to play a particularly prominent
role. For instance, the role of scholarship is explicitly recognized in Article 38(1)(d)

77
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See Cree Jones, Do Enforcement Provisions Promote Investment? New Evidence from a Natural Experiment in
the Investment Treaty Network (Working Paper, 2019), https://perma.cc/TQL8-N7CU.
See Jason Webb Yackee, Do Bilateral Investment Treaties Promote Foreign Direct Investment? Some Hints from
Alternative Evidence, 51 VA. J. INT’L L. 397 (2011).
As previously explained, following H.L.A. Hart’s distinction, an internal view is one that is
addressed to legal decision-makers; it can be descriptive or normative, but is at its core a doctrinal
exercise. An external view of law, in contrast, is one that examines the law from outside, seeking to
explain how it came to be or what its consequences might be in the real world. See generally HART,
supra note 15.
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of the Statute of the International Court of Justice, providing that the “teachings
of the most highly qualified publicists” can help inform the Court in determining
the content of international law.80 This invites doctrinal scholarship, and its impact
is evident in many sub-fields of international law. Treatises and whole journals are
devoted to doctrinal developments: the Journal of International Criminal Law, for
example, focuses on developments in that field, as does the ICSID Review: Foreign
Investment Law Journal.81 This is what we might call primary scholarship, designated
“positivism” in the AJIL Symposium. It is embodied in the work of the
International Law Commission, where scholars from various countries come
together to “progressively develop” international law.82 In contrast, scholars using
the social science approach to study international law have focused on external
questions like why states make international commitments, how international
institutions make decisions, and whether international commitments or the
decisions of international institutions produce changes in state behavior.
Second, unlike some traditional international law scholarship, the reach and
efficacy of international law under the social science approach are not to be
assumed but rather are treated as empirical matters to be assessed.83 This requires
that the target of study is not international law as a whole. A research project using
the social science approach is unlikely to try and make broad generalizations like
“treaties do not change behavior.” Instead, a project would study the influence of
specific regimes involving specific countries at specific times.
Third, the social science approach does not adopt a teleology. There is no
assumption that the world is shifting in one direction or another over time, either
toward compliance or legalism. In this, a social science approach contrasts with
some of the more optimistic scholarship of the liberal school of the 1990s. It also
does not assume that legalization or judicialization is a one-way street: indeed, two
of us recently co-authored a paper on the “Dejudicialization” of international
politics.84 In general, the world may be getting better or worse, but as E.H. Carr
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Statute of the International Court of Justice art. 38(1)(d), June 26, 1945, 59 Stat. 1055, 33 U.N.T.S.
993.
See J. INT’L CRIM. L., https://perma.cc/RQ3R-4EGJ; ICSID REVIEW, https://perma.cc/3B7WKWML.
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codification”.).
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long ago noted, there is no natural “harmony of interests” to which states are
evolving.85
Fourth, the social science approach does not view itself as a normative
project. While every scholar certainly has normative priors, social scientists are
engaged in a positivist enterprise of trying to describe the world as it is, rather than
how it should be. International law is itself not viewed as either “good” or “bad”;
rather it is a mechanism through which states “do things” together to achieve
common goals.86 Put another way, philosophers remind us that one can never
derive an “ought” from an “is”; in the academic division of labor, social science is
squarely focused on the “is.”87 To be clear, this is not to say that normative views
play no role in social science. Indeed, scholars’ normative priors influence the
projects they pursue, the methods they use, and the way they interpret their
results.88 Good social scientists should be reflexive about these priors, and aware
of any biases they might engender. And while the conclusions of social science
research can also help inform normative conclusions about what international law
ought to be, social scientists have no special expertise here. Normative matters
require debate on normative terrain.
Fifth, social scientists, in general, tend to begin with a healthy skepticism
about the efficacy of law: the effect of law is not assumed, but must be
demonstrated. This skepticism is not only because one should be critical of
claimed empirical relationships as a starting point for empirical research, but also
because social science research has frequently found that policies do not have their
intended effect. For instance, scholarship in development economics has found
that many large, directed interventions have no measurable effect on poverty
reduction. Scholars familiar with this kind of this research are perhaps more likely
to be skeptical of the notion that treaties without enforcement mechanisms are
likely to produce profound change in sticky areas like human rights, environmental
protection, or poverty reduction.89
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Although the social science approach to studying international law begins
with a healthy skepticism about the effect of laws, it is of course not the only
skeptical approach to studying international law. One major difference with many
of the other skeptical approaches on offer is that the social science approach
endorses the view that multiple methods can and should be used to tackle the
question at hand, so long as it helps with inference. The AJIL Symposium of 1999
was built on an assumption that different methodological approaches, captured
by labels, would lead to different outcomes. A social scientist’s approach to
method is different. It would make less sense to run a horse race between
quantitative and qualitative methods, for example. Instead, one should pick the
methods most appropriate to the problem at hand and move between them to
establish propositions. This makes social scientists skeptical about labels. Even
the term “empirical legal studies” can be interpreted more narrowly (for example,
to refer to quantitative methods) or broadly (to refer to any systematic approach
to data).
A second distinction is that social science is committed to a modernist view
of knowledge. Facts are to be ascertained and, once established, are considered to
be valid until falsified. This is a fundamental distinction with critical theory, which
is committed to a critique of objectivity.90 To be sure, critical scholars have called
for conversation with empirical social science. But at the end of the day, some of
the critical calls for engagement have tended to place the normative commitments
above positive inquiry.91
At the same time, there are some commonalities between a social science
approach and a critical approach to international law. Both recognize the role of
power as an important factor in determining outcomes, for example. But even
here there are differences. Critical scholars tend toward Foucauldian rather than
material conceptualizations of power. And social scientists do not explicitly
incorporate normative orientations into the analysis: whether or not developing
countries benefit or not from international law is treated as an empirical question
rather than an assumption or a normative commitment to be demonstrated.
Critical scholars might accuse social scientists of burying the normative
commitments in the posing of questions to be answered; but once the method is
deployed, the answers are to be pursued neutrally.
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Posner, supra note 88.
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Devon W. Carbado & Daria Roithmayr, Critical Race Theory Meets Social Science, 10 ANN. REV. L. SOC.
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critiques of objectivity and neutrality and potentially limits the theory’s ability to combat structural
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D. The Social Science Approach in Action
International legal scholarship using the social science approach has reorientated many debates toward concrete questions about the causes and
consequences of international agreements and institutions. Not only have these
projects explored a wide range of topics, but they have also spurred several highprofile debates within the international legal academy.
Perhaps, most prominent, has been a debate over the effectiveness of
international human rights agreements. In an important book on the topic, Beth
Simmons produced evidence that human rights commitments tended to be
observed when they were supported by domestic constituencies.92 It has been
followed by many other studies that also show the importance of domestic
constituencies.93 But it was contested with another important contribution by Eric
Posner, which argued that we are in the “Twilight” of international human rights.94
Notably, both scholars made empirical arguments using similar data to try and
assess whether international human rights treaties can be shown to produce
changes in the human rights records of countries that sign them. Although they
reached different conclusions, they argued that social science should be the way
the debate is resolved. This debate has continued to produce active disagreements
between international law scholars and political scientists.
As another example, social science approaches have produced a number of
debates about the efficacy of international dispute resolution. In seeking to
understand when international courts might be effective, Tom Ginsburg and
Richard McAdams put forward a coordination theory to explain the caseload of
the International Court of Justice.95 They argued that the evidence suggested that
international courts could be effective in resolving certain kinds of problems, even
without the power to impose sanctions for non-compliance.96 In contrast, Eric
Posner and John Yoo surveyed a broader set of international courts and argued
that they were likely to succeed only when they were “dependent” on appointing
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states.97 This argument generated responses that put forward a more nuanced
theory about the conditions for successful international courts.98
There have also been debates on topics such as whether countries comply
with WTO agreements, why countries sign bilateral investment agreements, and
the influence of regional organizations on international regulation. We view these
debates as a sign of a healthy field, in which evidence is subjected to multiple
analyses and interpretations. The result is a step-by-step process of scientific
discovery.

E. The Limits of the Social Science Approach
Although there are many advantages to the social science approach, there
are at least two limitations that we would be remiss to not mention. A first
limitation is that positivist social science has, in general, been subjected to massive
criticisms within the philosophy of science.99 Data is not self-creating, and
normative considerations can creep into the identification of measurement of
data, as can the underlying concepts that motivate research questions. No doubt,
these general critiques apply to social science work on international law as much
as other fields. Careful scholarship and scholars must be skeptical about methods
and their application.
The question is whether this critique should lead us to reject the approach.
From our point of view, as social scientists, we think of positivist social science as
a “research program” deploying a common set of assumptions, with the goal of
explanation. The key question in replacing a research program is whether a better
approach is possible.100 The advantage of a social science orientation is that
decisions on conceptualization and measurement are themselves to be made
transparent. Social science practices seem to us to be superior to any alternative.
Further, the idea that knowledge is provisional invites attempts to disprove
propositions. Falsifying particular studies is a sign of progress, not a reason to
reject a research program.
A second limitation is that social science may not provide immediate answers
as to how to navigate the rapidly changing world. Many areas of international
cooperation are currently in a moment of transition. Among the issues that are
transforming the world are the return of the state, the climate crisis, a reduction
97
98

99
100
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in global integration, and the rise of demands for indigenous recognition. The rise
of China is no doubt a preeminent development that has profound challenges for
international law.101
The general approach of positivist social science may provide help tackling
these issues, but there is a critical caution that must be observed. Positivist social
science looks backward to existing data. It will then assess the patterns to see how
they comport with theory and will put forward conditional propositions about the
research questions asked. But, if one seeks to apply existing models and findings
to new phenomena and configurations, one needs to take external validity
seriously. This means closely considering the conditional effects of current
findings and speculating on how changing international configurations affect
these underlying conditions. While we are not confident that the world in ten or
twenty years will look the same as it does today, we do believe that this kind of
rigorous, cautious, and skeptical approach is necessary for international law to
continue to make progress as a field.

IV. C ONCLUSION
Oppenheim thought that the science of international law should be practiced
by those “who are imbued with the idealistic outlook on life and matters.”102 In
contrast, we hope that that the social science of international law will continue to
be normatively restrained, empirically informed, and more skeptical than the
international law scholarship of the past.
Additionally, we hope that international legal scholars continue to build
bridges between the practice of international law, the legal academy, and other
social science departments. International agreements and institutions pose a range
of topics worthy of research, institutions require legal expertise to fully
understand, and the social sciences are continually developing new methods to
improve the credibility of research. In short, we hope that others will continue to
join the effort to bring social science approaches to the study of international law.
In a parallel field, Professor Ran Hirschl made a similar call for
interdisciplinarity when he proposed moving from “Comparative Constitutional
Law” to “Comparative Constitutional Studies.”103 Hirschl’s call was for the
integration of social science and law to understand a dynamically changing field.
International legal studies should follow this trajectory to better understand the
promise and limits of international law.
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